MATEMATISKA INSTITUTIONEN STOCKHOLMS UNIVERSITET Avd. Matematik Examinator: Jonas Bergström Lecturer: Tuomas Tajakka

14.00-19.00

14 March 2023

Tentamensskrivning i

Mathematics of Cryptography, 7,5 hp

There are 2 pages and 8 problems with total score of 85 points. The score from the exam is added to the score from the homework assignments. Grades are then given by the following intervals:

A: 100-92 p B: 91-84 p C: 83-76p D: 75-68 p E: 67-60 p

Remember to justify your answers carefully. No calculators or computers may be used.

- 1. Define the following terms:
 - a) symmetric key cryptosystem

Solution: a symmetric key cryptosystem is a cryptosystem in which both parties know a secret key k which is used for both encryption and decryption.

b) chosen plaintext attack

Solution: a chosen plaintext attack is an attack on a cryptosystem in which the adversary chooses messages m_1, \ldots, m_n , obtains the encrypted messages $e(m_1), \ldots, e(m_n)$, and from this tries to deduce a way to decrypt a general cyphertext.

c) cryptographic hash function

Solution: a *cryptographic hash function* is a function which sends a document to a binary string. It is typically required to be fast to compute, hard to invert, and it should be hard to find two documents with the same hash.

d) encoding scheme

Solution: an *encoding scheme* is a method of converting one sort of data into another sort of data, e.g. converting text to numbers.

e) big- \mathcal{O} notation

Solution: let $f, g : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ be functions. Then we say $f = \mathcal{O}(g)$ if there exist $C, N \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $f(x) \leq Cg(x)$ for all x > N.

2. a) State Fermat's little theorem.

Solution: Let p be a prime number and $a \in \mathbb{N}$. Then

$$a^{p-1} \equiv \begin{cases} 1 \pmod{p} & p \nmid a; \\ 0 \pmod{p} & p \mid a. \end{cases}$$

b) Use Fermat's little theorem and the fast powering algorithm to find the multiplicative inverse of 5 in \mathbb{F}_{13} . Show all steps.

2 p

 $2\,\mathrm{p}$

 $2\,\mathrm{p}$

 $2\,\mathrm{p}$

3 p

 $2\,\mathrm{p}$

Solution: We apply Fermat's little theorem with a = 5 and p = 13 to see that $5^{-1} \equiv 5^{p-2} = 5^{11} \pmod{13}$.

Writing $11 = 2^0 + 2^1 + 2^3$, we compute

$$5^{2^{0}} \equiv 5 \pmod{13};$$

$$5^{2^{1}} \equiv 5^{2} \equiv 25 \equiv -1 \pmod{13};$$

$$5^{2^{2}} \equiv (-1)^{2} \equiv 1 \pmod{13};$$

$$5^{2^{3}} \equiv 1^{2} \equiv 1 \pmod{13}.$$

Hence we calculate

$$5^{-1} \equiv 5^{2^0 + 2^1 + 2^3} \equiv 5 \cdot (-1) \cdot 1 \equiv -5 \equiv 8 \pmod{13}.$$

c) In general, how many multiplications does the fast powering algorithm require?

Solution: To compute $a^n \pmod{p}$, the fast powering algorithm requires at most $2\log_2(n)$ multiplications: by successively squaring, one can compute $a^{2\lfloor \log_2(n) \rfloor}$ in $\lfloor \log_2(n) \rfloor$ multiplications. To get $a^n \pmod{p}$, one has to then multiply at most $\lceil \log_2(n) \rceil$ of these values together, which requires at most another $\lfloor \log_2(n) \rfloor$ multiplications.

- 3. a) What do we mean by the discrete logarithm problem in a finite group G?
 2 p
 Solution: The discrete logarithm problem in a finite group G means the problem of finding x ∈ Z satisfying g^x = h for given g, h ∈ G.
 - b) Consider the following invertible matrices with coefficients in \mathbb{F}_7 :

$$g = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad h = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 6 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Implement Shank's algorithm to solve the DLP $g^x = h$. You might find useful the identity

$$g^7 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

4	n
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 $4\,\mathrm{p}$

Solution: Since $g^7 = \text{id}$ and 7 is a prime number, we find N := ord(g) = 7. Hence $2 < \sqrt{N} < 3$, so $n = 1 + \lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor = 3$. We now create two lists:

$$\{e, g, g^2, g^3\}$$
 and $\{h, hg^{-3}, hg^{-6}, hg^{-9}\}.$

One computes

$$g^{2} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
$$g^{3} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
$$hg^{-6} = hg = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Without computing more, we find a match: $hg^{-6} = e$. Hence

$$h = g^0 \cdot g^6 = g^6,$$

so x = 6.

c) What is the running time of Shank's algorithm for solving the DLP in \mathbb{F}_p^* ? Explain.

Solution: Shanks' algorithm takes $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N} \log N)$ steps, where $N = \operatorname{ord}(g)$. Set $n = 1 + \lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor$. The creation of the lists $\{e, g, \ldots, g^n\}$ and $\{h, hg^{-n}, \ldots, hg^{-n^2}\}$ takes approximately 2n steps, since we can compute $u := g^{-n}$ one time and construct the second list as $\{h, hu, \ldots, hu^n\}$. Finding a match between the two lists of length n+1 takes $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ steps, so this determines the running time of the algorithm. Since $n \approx \sqrt{N}$, this comes down to a total running time of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N} \log N)$.

4. a) Describe the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm.

Solution: The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is a method to efficiently solve the discrete logarithm problem $g^x = h$ in a group G when $\operatorname{ord}(g) = N$ is composite. It consists of two parts.

Part 1: Suppose $N = p^e$, where p is a prime and e is a positive integer. We can solve $g^x = h$ as follows:

1. We look for x in the form

$$x = x_0 + x_1 p + x_2 p^2 + \ldots + x_{e-1} p^{e-1}$$

where $0 \le x_i < p$ for i = 0, ..., e - 1. This is possible, since if a solution x exists, we can assume that it satisfies $0 \le x \le N - 1$.

2. Suppose we know x_0, \ldots, x_{i-1} for some $i \ge 0$. We can solve x_i from the equation

$$(g^{p^{e-1}})^{x_i} = \left(h \cdot g^{-x_0 - x_1 p - \dots - x_{i-1} p^{i-1}}\right)^{p^{e-i-1}}$$

Part 2: For general N, write

$$N = q_1 \dots q_n$$

where the q_i are pairwise coprime. Then we can solve $g^x = h$ as follows:

1. For each i, solve the discrete logarithm problem

$$(q^{N/q_i})^{x_i} = h^{N/q_i}.$$

- 2. Use the Chinese remainder theorem to find x such that $x \equiv x_i \pmod{q_i}$; this x solves the original DLP.
- b) Using a cryptosystem based on the DLP in \mathbb{F}_p^* , how should you choose the modulus p in order to shield against the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm?

Solution: One should choose p such that p-1 can't be factorised into powers of small primes. Ideally, one should choose p such that $\frac{1}{2}(p-1)$ is prime.

c) What is the running time of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm together with the naive algorithm to solve a DLP in a group with N elements?

Solution: The naive algorithm to solve a DLP $g^x = h$ in a group with N elements takes at most N steps: we have $\operatorname{ord}(g) \leq N$, so we have to try at most N values of x to find a solution. Now suppose $N = p_1^{e_1} \dots p_n^{e_n}$ as before. Then Part 2 of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm involves solving n DLPs for elements of order $p_i^{e_i}$ for each i, and by Part 1, each of these amounts to solving e_i DLPs for elements of order p_i . Thus, in total this takes $\mathcal{O}(\sum_i e_i p_i)$ steps. The Chinese remainder theorem has a running time of $\mathcal{O}(\log N)$. Thus, the total running time is $\mathcal{O}(\sum e_i p_i + \log N)$.

 $4\,\mathrm{p}$

 $2\,\mathrm{p}$

5. a) Describe the RSA public key cryptosystem and explain what role Euler's theorem plays in it.

In the RSA public key cryptosystem, Alice picks two large primes p and q, and publishes the modulus N := pq and a public key e satisfying gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1. This allows her to compute $d := e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$.

When Bob wants to send Alice a message m, he can send her the value $m^e \pmod{N}$, which Alice can decrypt because $(m^e)^d \equiv m \pmod{N}$. This last statement follows from Euler's theorem, which says that if N = pq is a product of two primes, $g := \gcd(p-1, q-1)$, and $\gcd(a, N) = 1$, then $a^{(p-1)(q-1)/g} \equiv 1 \pmod{N}$. Indeed, since $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$, we can write

$$de = 1 + k \frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{g}$$

for some $k \in \mathbb{Z}$, and consequently

$$(m^e)^d = m^{de} = m^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)/g} = m \cdot (m^{(p-1)(q-1)/g})^k \equiv m \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$$

b) Solve the congruence:

$$x^{27} \equiv 52 \mod 55$$

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 $5\,\mathrm{p}$

Solution 1: We use Euler's theorem. Note that $55 = 5 \cdot 11$. We find that 27 is coprime to $(p-1)(q-1) = 4 \cdot 10 = 40$, so by Euler's theorem, the unique solution is

 $x = 52^d \pmod{55}$, where $d = 27^{-1} \pmod{20}$,

since $20 = 4 \cdot 10/\gcd(4, 10)$. By inspection, we notice that $3 \cdot 27 \equiv 3 \cdot 7 = 21 \equiv 1 \pmod{20}$. Thus,

$$x \equiv 52^3 \equiv (-3)^3 = -27 \equiv 28 \pmod{55}$$

Solution 2: Note that $55 = 5 \cdot 11$. By the Chinese remainder theorem, it is enough to solve the congruences

$$x_1^{27} \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$$

and

$$x_2^{27} \equiv 8 \pmod{11}$$

and lift these to a solution modulo 55. Clearly x = 0 is not a solution to either equation, so for $p \in \{5, 11\}$ we may assume that $x^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ (by Fermat's little theorem). Hence we have to solve

$$x_1^3 \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$$

and

$$x_2^7 \equiv 8 \pmod{11}.$$

Some trial and error gives $x_1 \equiv 3 \pmod{5}$ and $x_2 \equiv 6 \pmod{11}$. Finally, finding $0 \le x < 55$ which reduces to x_1 modulo 5 and to x_2 modulo 11 is easy by checking which of the numbers 6 + 11n work for $0 \le n < 5$. This gives the solution x = 28.

c) Alice and Bob both create keys for the RSA cryptosystem. They both choose the modulus N = 8549, but Alice's encryption key is $e_A = 5$ while Bob's is $e_B = 4187$. Eve encrypts the message m = 44 using both keys and finds that the ciphertexts coincide. Using this information help Eve factor the modulus N. (*Hint:* $93^2 = 8649$.)

Solution: We are given that $44^5 \equiv 44^{4187} \pmod{8549}$, so $44^{4182} \equiv 1 \pmod{8549}$. Hence also $44^{2\cdot4182} = 44^{8364} \equiv 1 \pmod{8549}$. It seems reasonable to believe that (p-1)(q-1) = 8364 given this information. This gives p + q = pq - 8364 + 1 = 186. Then we have

$$(X-p)(X-q) = X^{2} - (p+q)X + pq = X^{2} - 186X + 8549,$$

which we can solve with the quadratic formula. Noting that $186 = 2 \cdot 93$ and using the hint $93^2 = 8649$, we obtain the solutions

$$\frac{186 \pm \sqrt{186^2 - 4 \cdot 8549}}{2} = \frac{2 \cdot 93 \pm 2\sqrt{93^2 - 8549}}{2} = 93 \pm \sqrt{100}$$

Thus $N = 83 \cdot 103$.

6. a) Let N = 44377, $F(T) = T^2 - N$, and $a = \lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor + 1 = 210$. Characterize which of the numbers

 $F(a), F(a+1), F(a+2), \dots, F(a+100)$

are divisible by 5 and which are divisible by 11.

Solution: Let's start with the values modulo 5. We have $N \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$, so 5 divides F(T) if and only if $T^2 \equiv 2 \pmod{5}$. But the squares modulo 5 are 0, 1, 4, so we see that F(T) is never divisible by 5.

We do the same for the values modulo 11. Now $N \equiv 3 \pmod{11}$, so 11 divides F(T) if and only if $T^2 \equiv 3 \pmod{11}$. This equation has the two solutions $T \equiv 5, 6 \pmod{11}$. Since $a = 210 \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$, we see that F(a + x) is divisible by 11 if and only if $x \equiv 4, 5 \pmod{11}$. Thus, the values divisible by 11 are

$$F(a+4), F(a+5), F(a+15), F(a+16), \ldots, F(a+92), F(a+93).$$

b) Now set N = 3219577, $F(T) = T^2 - N$, and $a = \lfloor \sqrt{N} \rfloor + 1 = 1794$. After computing F(a+i) for $i = 0, \ldots, 350$, we found the following 13-smooth numbers:

$$(a+7)^{2} - N = 2^{3} \cdot 3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13$$
$$(a+19)^{2} - N = 2^{6} \cdot 3^{4} \cdot 13$$
$$(a+59)^{2} - N = 2^{4} \cdot 3 \cdot 7^{3} \cdot 13$$
$$(a+73)^{2} - N = 2^{7} \cdot 3^{3} \cdot 7 \cdot 11$$
$$(a+227)^{2} - N = 2^{5} \cdot 3^{3} \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13$$
$$(a+343)^{2} - N = 2^{3} \cdot 3^{7} \cdot 7 \cdot 11$$

Find at least four perfect squares one can form out of these numbers.

Solution: We have 6 primes ≤ 13 , so we represent each of the found 13-smooth numbers by vectors in \mathbb{F}_2^6 whose *i*-th entry is the parity of the power of the *i*-th prime in its factorisation. Putting these into a matrix as column vectors, we obtain

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

 $3\,\mathrm{p}$

4 p

which we reduce with Gaussian elimination to

1	0	0	1	1	1	
0	1	0	1	0	1	
0	0	1	0	0	0	
0	0	0	0	0	0	•
0	0	0	0	0	0	
$\setminus 0$	0	0	0	0	0/	

A general element in the kernel is (a, b, 0, c, a + b, b + c). Taking for example $(a, b, c) \in \{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)\}$ gives four perfect squares corresponding to the vectors

$$\begin{split} &(1,0,0,0,1,0) \to (2^3 \cdot 3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13) \cdot (2^5 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13); \\ &(0,1,0,0,1,1) \to (2^6 \cdot 3^4 \cdot 13) \cdot (2^5 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13) \cdot (2^3 \cdot 3^7 \cdot 7 \cdot 11); \\ &(0,0,0,1,0,1) \to (2^7 \cdot 3^3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11) \cdot (2^3 \cdot 3^7 \cdot 7 \cdot 11); \\ &(1,1,0,0,0,1) \to (2^3 \cdot 3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13) \cdot (2^6 \cdot 3^4 \cdot 13) \cdot (2^3 \cdot 3^7 \cdot 7 \cdot 11). \end{split}$$

c) Write down all the checks for factors of N coming from the perfect squares you found in (b). You do not need to carry out the computations.

 $4\,\mathrm{p}$

 $3\,\mathrm{p}$

Solution: Above, we have found four numbers which are 13-smooth and perfect squares; say b_1^2, \ldots, b_4^2 . We also know that these are the reductions of some a_1^2, \ldots, a_4^2 modulo N, and for each i, we want to compute $gcd(N, a_i - b_i)$ in order to hopefully factor N. So we need to check the following quantities:

$$gcd(N, (a + 7)(a + 227) - 2^{4} \cdot 3^{2} \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13);$$

$$gcd(N, (a + 19)(a + 227)(a + 343) - 2^{7} \cdot 3^{7} \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13);$$

$$gcd(N, (a + 73)(a + 343) - 2^{5} \cdot 3^{5} \cdot 7 \cdot 11);$$

$$gcd(N, (a + 7)(a + 19)(a + 343) - 2^{6} \cdot 3^{6} \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13).$$

7. a) Consider the elliptic curve $E: y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$ over \mathbb{F}_5 . Check that E indeed is an elliptic curve and that the points P = (2, 4) and Q = (3, 1) are on E, and calculate P + Q. 3 p

Solution: To check that an equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ is an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_p , we need that

$$\Delta = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

In this case, $\Delta = 4 + 27 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$, so E is an elliptic curve.

The point (2, 4) is on the curve iff $4^2 \equiv 2^3 + 2 + 1 \equiv 11 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$, which is true. Similarly, (3, 1) is on the curve iff $1^3 \equiv 3^3 + 3 + 1 \equiv 31 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$, which is also true.

We calculate P + Q as follows. The line through P and Q is y = 2(x - 3) + 1. We obtain

$$y^{2} = x^{3} + x + 1 = 4(x - 3)^{2} + 4(x - 3) + 1,$$

so $x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{5}$. Since P and Q are points of intersection, we can factor out (x-2)(x-3), which makes the last factor (x-4). Plugging in x = 4 in y = 2(x-3) + 1 gives y = 3. Finally, to obtain P + Q, we need to replace y by -y, which gives

$$P + Q = (4, 2).$$

b) An *inflection point* of an elliptic curve E is a point P where the tangent line meets E with multiplicity 3. What is the order of such at point P? Draw a picture.

Solution: If the tangent line meets E with multiplicity 3 in a point P, it follows that the third point of intersection of the tangent line at P with E is again P. By definition, this point is -2P, so we have -2P = P and thus 3P = 0. Hence P has order 1 or order 3.

Your picture should contain a non-vertical tangent line to an elliptic curve which "crosses" the curve, such that it will not intersect it in any other point. Example:



c) Let E be an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_{53} . Explain why the number of points on E is between 39 and 69.

Solution: By Hasse's theorem, the number of points $|E(\mathbb{F}_p)|$ on an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_p satisfy $|E(\mathbb{F}_p)| = p + 1 - t_p$, where $|t_p| \le 2\sqrt{p}$. In this case, $2\sqrt{p} = 2\sqrt{53} < 2\sqrt{64} = 16$, so

$$39 = 54 - 15 \le |E(\mathbb{F}_{53})| \le 54 + 15 = 69.$$

d) Why is the fast powering algorithm particularly fast on an elliptic curve compared to an arbitrary group?

Solution: Subtracting points on elliptic curves is equally time-efficient as adding points. Therefore, when computing nP, one need not restrict themselves to expanding n as a binary number, but can also allow for minus signs between powers of 2. This will lead to a more efficient fast powering algorithm because the number of steps to compute nP may be reduced.

8. a) Describe the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange. How should the public parameters be chosen?

Solution: A trusted party publishes a prime number p, an elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_p , and a point P on E. If Alice and Bob want to perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, they should work as follows:

- Alice picks an integer n_A and sends Bob the point $n_A P$.
- Bob picks an integer n_B and sends Alice the point $n_B P$.
- Alice computes $n_A(n_B P)$ and Bob computes $n_B(n_A P)$. This is their shared secret key.

 $3\,\mathrm{p}$

 $1\,\mathrm{p}$

For safety reasons, the public parameters should be chosen in such a way that the ECDLP has no easy solutions. For instance, one should avoid points P such that $\operatorname{ord}(P)$ is a product of powers of small primes, as this would make the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm a feasible attack. Similarly, one should avoid pairs (p, E) with $|E(\mathbb{F}_p)| = p + 1$ (i.e. supersingular elliptic curves), since in this case the MOV algorithm yields a feasible attack.

b) What is the main benefit of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves compared to those based on \mathbb{F}_{p}^{*} ?

Solution: The main benefit is that the DLP in \mathbb{F}_p^* can be solved in subexponential time using the index calculus (meaning $\mathcal{O}(p^{\epsilon})$ for every $\epsilon > 0$), whereas the fastest known algorithm to solve the ECDLP in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ takes $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{p})$ steps.

c) Describe Lenstra's factorization algorithm. What kinds of numbers does it factor particularly efficiently?

Solution: In Lenstra's factorization algorithm, one starts with a number N = pq which one wants to factorize. One then picks an elliptic curve E over $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and a point P on it. One then calculates $2!P, 3!P, 4!P, \ldots$ At any step, it may be that the computation of n!P fails because one needs to compute the inverse of a denominator, which does not exist in $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$; it follows that

gcd(denominator, N) > 1,

and the hope is that this gcd is a proper factor of N. If it is, we are done; if not, we try again with a different elliptic curve and a different point.

Lenstra's factorisation algorithm has a running time which only depends on the smallest prime factor of N. Thus, it factors N particularly efficiently if it has a relatively small prime factor.

 $3\,\mathrm{p}$